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Abstract
New rules that are not found in traditional auctions have surfaced in Internet auctions. One
such rule is the buyout option, which allows a bidder to end the auction immediately by
purchasing the item at a buyout price specified by the seller. Very little research has been
carried out to examine the buyout option. This study conducted an exploratory analysis of the
various factors affecting bidders’ choice of this new alternative. 1087 auction data of the Ty
Beanie Baby Bears category at the eBay auction site were collected and analysed. The major
findings from the empirical study are that the likelihood of bidders choosing the buyout
option could be increased if sellers set (a) a lower buyout price with reference to other online
prices, (b) a buyout price that is close to the starting minimum bid and (c) a longer duration
for their auctions.
Keywords
Internet auction, buyout option, eBay, “Buy It Now” option, “Buy It Now” price

1. Introduction
Internet auction has gained tremendous popularity since its inception in 1995. As a new
type of economic exchange mechanism in the electronic commerce, it has caught immense
attention from both mass media and academy. An online survey conducted by
Nielsen//NetRatings and Harris Interactive eCommercePulse shows that by May of 2001,
Internet auction revenue claimed a 10 percent stake of overall Internet spending, over 6.2
million Internet users bought at Internet auctions with a total spending of US$556 million in
May 20011. The popular press has estimated consumer-to-consumer (C2C) online auction
revenue at more than US$15 billion in 2004 (Lake 2000).
Internet auctions operate in different formats and manners from traditional auctions.
Sellers and bidders enjoy high autonomy and flexibility geographically and temporarily under
these new rules and formats (Lucking-Reiley 2000). In recent years a striking phenomenon in
1

Source: “eBay.com Generates 64 Percent of Total Auction Revenues for May 2001”, BUSINESS WIRE, New
York, Jun 28, 2001,
http://www.corporateir. net/ireye/ir_site.zhtml?ticker=NTRT&script=411&layout=-6&item_id=186
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online C2C auction markets is the rise of a new selling mechanism – auction with a “buyout”
option. It has been adopted by major Internet auction sites, such as eBay, Yahoo!Auction,
Amazon, Bid-or-Buy. The buyout option of an auction allows sellers to specify a threshold
fixed price at which they are willing to sell an item, so that bidders could end the auction
immediately by purchasing the item at the designated fixed buyout price. Internet auction
sites intend to provide an opportunity to bidders who are unwilling to wait until the end of an
auction, to obtain the auctioned items instantly at fair prices, and to enable sellers to sell their
listed goods faster for the prices they want.
Buyout option has become an important feature that continues to drive seller success and
increase the trade volume in some Internet auction sites. For example, at eBay - the world’s
leading Internet auction site, the “Buy It Now” – a temporary buyout option, was the primary
source of the fixed price offering which contributed, in aggregate, approximately US$1.1
billion or 24% of total Gross Merchandise Sales during the forth quarter of 20022.
In light of the growing importance of Internet auction and the fact that Internet auction
differs from traditional auction in many aspects, a large amount of research has studied the
exchange mechanism in Internet auction. However, up to date there are very few papers
examining the buyout option. This paper seeks to fill this gap by conducting an exploratory
analysis to unravel the factors affecting bidders’ decision-making to exercise the buyout
option. A research model encompassing bidders’ choice of exercising buyout option and the
potential determinants was developed. Auction data from eBay were collected and analyzed.
Findings from this study have both academic and practical implications. They represent
initial steps toward building a generalized theory of Internet auction. Understanding the
bidding behavior of auction participants with respect to buyout option would help sellers to
not only increase the possibility to sell off their items, but also get reasonably good prices
from buyers. Similarly, our findings would help online auction houses to provide better
advice and more useful tools to their clients, to improve their revenues from the increased
“inventory turnover”, and to achieve a better reputation as an efficient Internet auction site.

2. Conceptualization and Hypotheses
Despite the increasing interest in studying Internet auction since the early 1990s, there is
very limited work on the buyout option, which was not until recently adopted by major
Internet auction sites. The few previous papers on buyout option mainly focus on modeling
the impact of varying attitudes toward risk of the participants in auctions with buyout options,
especially the impact on sellers’ revenue. Budish and Takeyama (2001) examined a model of
an English auction with a permanent buyout price. It found that sellers’ expected profits tend
to increase with a buyout price when they faced with risk-averse bidders. Moreover, it shows
that when bidders are risk-averse, the expected revenue of the seller in an English action with
a buyout price is higher than that in either a standard first-price sealed-bid or Dutch auction.
This finding is contrary to the conclusion made from a benchmark model in offline auction in
McAfee and McMillan (1987).
Mathews (2001a, 2001b and 2001c) analyzed models of buyout option resembling the
temporary buyout option at eBay. The major findings are as follows: 1. a risk neutral seller
2
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facing risk neutral bidders will choose a buyout price such that the buyout option will not be
“exercised” in equilibrium. However, if either the seller, bidders or both are risk averse,
these can lead to the seller offering a buyout price such that the option will be exercised with
positive probability in equilibrium. 2. When market participants are not “time sensitive”, the
seller will not select a buyout price that will be exercised in equilibrium. When market
participants are time impatient (i.e. they prefer the auction to end sooner, all other things
being equal), the seller will select a buyout price that will result in the buyout option being
exercised in equilibrium. 3. When sellers can select two buyout prices for an item, a risk
neutral seller facing risk neutral bidders will select a series of buyout prices that will not be
exercised in equilibrium. A risk-averse seller, however, will select a series of buyout prices
that will allow each option to be exercised in equilibrium. Moreover, seller who is risk-averse
will actually prefer to sell the item with two buyout options rather than a single buyout option,
when faced with risk neutral bidders.
This paper focuses on examining the buyers’ decision making in auctions with temporary
buyout option. There are basically two types of buyout option in Internet auction, namely the
“permanent” buyout option and the “temporary” buyout option (Mathews 2001a). A buyout
option is “permanent” when it is available throughout the duration of the auction. A bidder
has the opportunity to choose the buyout option anytime during the course of bidding.
Examples of auction sites offering the “permanent” buyout options include Yahoo! and
Amazon3. On the other hand, the “temporary” buyout option may not be available for the
whole duration of auction. A good example is the “Buy It Now” at eBay, which is only
available when no traditional bids have been placed in the auction.
eBay launched the “Buy It Now” feature near the end of 2000, resulting from its
extensive customer research which shows that many bidders and sellers wanted to have the
ability of completing a transaction faster at the Internet auction site (Dennehy 2000). With
this feature, the seller can set a “Buy It Now” price at which the bidder could instantly
purchase the listed item without the bidding process. This option is temporary in that it is
only available when no bids have been placed. This means that the first bidder has a choice
between ending the auction with “Buy It Now” and placing her bid for the item. If the bidder
chooses the “Buy It Now” option, the auction will end immediately with her getting the item
and paying the “Buy It Now” price. If the first bidder chooses to place a bid for that item, the
“Buy It Now” option will disappear and the auction will continue as a normal auction and
close at the ending time specified by the seller.
Drawing on our understanding of eBay’s temporary buyout option and the few existing
research work, we identified the following factors that might influence buyers’ decision to
exercise the buyout option: the difference between the online price and the buyout price, the
difference between the buyout price and the minimum bid, seller’s reputation and the auction
duration.

2.1 Relative Prices
In a typical Internet auction, a bidder’s payoff equals to the difference between her
valuation of the auctioned item and the amount she has to pay for it, if she wins the auction.
A bidder’s payoff is zero if she does not obtain the goods. In an auction with buyout option, a
bidder’s payoff is the difference between her valuation of the item and the buyout price if she
3

Please see http://auctions.yahoo.com, and http://s1.amazon.com for details.
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exercises the buyout option instead of placing bids. Motivated by obtaining the optimal
economic gain from the purchase, obviously a bidder’s choice of buyout option is primarily
determined by her valuation of the item with respect to the buyout price set by the seller.
When valuating the goods listed in auction sites, the bidders often turn to the online
shopping price as a reference. In a study conducted by Ernst and Young, 75% of those
surveyed cited lower prices as an important motivator to shopping online. The presence of
shopping search engines allows consumers to search and compare online prices, among other
features of the product, effortlessly. If the buyout price of an auctioned item is less than the
online prices offered by other vendors, it is more likely a bidder will choose the buyout
option. Hence, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of a bidder choosing the buyout option is positively related
to the difference between the online price and the buyout price.
The minimum bid is the opening price set by the seller. Previous studies on Internet
auction have suggested that setting a low minimum bid tends to increase seller’s profit (e.g.,
Lucking-Reiley, Bryan, Prasad & Reeves 2000). In an auction with buyout option, the bidder
will have to pay either the buyout price if she exercises the buyout option or a final price if
she wins the item by submitting the highest bids among competitors. Normally the buyout
option price or the final price is higher than the minimum bid. When facing the buyout option
choice, the bidder would compare the fixed buyout price and the expected final price upon
winning the item through the bidding process. If she expects to win the auctioned goods at a
lower price than the buyout price, she would not choose the buyout option. The bidder would
assess the possibility of paying less through the normal auction process than through
exercising the buyout option. The larger the difference between the buyout price and the
minimum bid, the higher the probability of final winning price falling between buyout price
and the minimum bid. Based on the above reasoning, we hypothesis that:
Hypothesis 2: The likelihood of a bidder choosing the buyout option is negatively related
to the difference between the buyout price and the minimum bid.

2.2 Seller’s Reputation
Participant’s reputation has been recognized as a critical issue in Internet auction (Melnik
& Alm 2000). Fraudulent behavior is possible because Internet auction permits virtually
anonymous interactions. Online winning bidders cannot guarantee receiving the goods after
they have made the payments. They must trust the “unknown” sellers to send them the items.
In fact, online auction fraud is one of the leading types of complaints that the Federal Trade
Commission received about Internet commerce (Keegan 1999).
Likewise, if the seller has a good reputation, the bidder might perceive that the buyout
price for the listed item is reasonably set according to its value, thus she will feel more
comfortable to purchase the goods at the buyout price. The feedback system at eBay is well
publicized as functioning as the reputation mechanism for the participants, which is made up
of a feedback rating number and detailed feedback comments. Under this rating system, the
seller or buyer receives +1 point for each positive comment, 0 points for each neutral
comment and –1 point for each negative comment. Anyone whose cumulative total rating
goes below –4 will be penalized in the form of debarment. The cumulative total rating is
presumably a sign of the participants’ reputations, thus we hypothesize that:

7th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, 10-13 July 2003, Adelaide, South Australia

Page

350

W. WAN, TEO H. H., and L. Zhu

Determinants of Buy-It-Now Auction Choice on eBay

Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of a bidder choosing the buyout option is positively related
to the reputation of the seller.

2.3 Auction Duration
Generally the buyer is more inclined to choose the buyout option if the price she is
willing to pay for the listed goods is higher than the fixed buyout price. From the consumer’s
perspective, price can be defined as what the consumer must give up to purchase a product or
service. Researchers in marketing have identified the following components that make up the
price the consumer is willing to pay: (a) Money, (b) Time, (c) Cognitive Activity, (d)
Behavior Effort, and (e) Value (Peter & Olson 1990). When other conditions are the same,
the increase of any of the above components will lead to an increased price the consumer is
willing to pay, thus a higher possibility that this price exceeds the buyout price. Therefore, for
the same auctioned goods, the higher the time cost in purchasing the item, the more likely
that the buyer would exercise the buyout option.
The time cost of buying the products by auction is largely determined by the auction
duration. Unlike the traditional auction in which the auction duration is usually pre-set by the
auctioneer, the Internet auction allows the seller to specify the starting and ending time. In
general, the auction length in eBay could be extended to as long as ten days. It enables online
bidders to have higher flexibility in bidding for their desired items. However, an auction with
a longer duration also impose higher delay and monitoring costs on bidders, because they
have to wait a longer time for a transaction to end, and have to keep watching on the auction
and revising their bids when eBay’s “proxy bidding”4 system informs them that they are outbid by other bidders (Vakrat & Siedmann 2000). All these impose a cost on the bidder’s time.
Base on the above reasoning, we hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 4: The likelihood of a bidder choosing the buyout option is positively related
to the duration of the auction.

3. Research Method
We collected the auction data of “Ty Beanie Baby Bears” - plush toy bears under stuffed
with PVC or PE pellets7, from eBay’s website between August 18, 2001 and October 2, 2001.
“Ty Beanie Baby Bears” was selected because this category contains very rich transactions.
With the increasing popularity of Ty Beanie Babies since the later half of 1997, Internet
auction sites have become an important secondary market for collectors to find the particular
toys that cannot be found in retail stores anymore, as well as a market for newly released
Beanie Babies5. Besides, the online price for each type of beanie baby bear was obtained
from “Beanie Best Buy.com” (www.beaniebestbuy.com), an online store selling a large
selection of Ty Beanie Babies Bears. It claims that the prices it offered are the lowest
available6 . Thus the prices from this store were used to represent the lowest prices (best
4

5

Please see Bajari and Hortacsu (2001) for details of “proxy bidding”.
Source: http://www.worldcollectorsnet.com/beanie

6

A check of some other online stores showed that on average, Ty Beanie Babies Bears are cheaper on Beanie Best
Buy.com.
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bargain) bidders can get from buying online.
A software written in the programming language Perl, running on the Windows platform,
was used to automatically collect the data. The use of a computer program in data collection
improves the recording accuracy and efficiency. Our software worked as follows. It visited
the eBay home page, extracted the link “Doll and Bear” and it followed the web URL
(universal resource locator) to the page that contained the first 50 of auctions in this category.
It then followed the URL to each page of these 50 auctions, and extracted the details of the
auction history and saved them into a database. The details included the ID of the auction,
seller’s ID, seller’s feedback ratings, description of auctioned item, “Buy It Now” price, and
starting minimum bid. The same procedures were then carried out for all auctions on
subsequent pages. There could be 20 to 30 such pages daily.
After the collection process, we revisited the raw data and sorted out the auctions with
“Buy It Now” option set by the seller. Then we filtered the records according to the following
selection criteria. First, auctions of items other than Ty Beanie Baby Bears were removed.
Second, only auctions selling a single Ty Beanie Baby Bear in “Mint condition with Mint
tag” (MWMT) were included. Further, these sellers have to be registered users of eBay.
Auctions with item listing revised by sellers (for example, description, first bids, or “Buy It
Now” changed) were not included. Finally, to improve the analysis accuracy, we also
excluded those auctions in which the online prices of “Beanie Baby Bears” cannot be found
from “Beanie Best Buy.com”.
A sample of 1,904 transaction records of auctions with “Buy It Now” options were
obtained, including 1,087 records ending with a sale and 817 records ending without sale. For
each record ending with a sale, the following data were recorded (variable names used in the
analysis model are displayed in brackets):
− The ID of the auction
− The description of the type of bear
− Whether the auction ends with “Buy It Now” (BIN); 1 if so else 0
− The final price of the auction (fprice)
− The online price of the bear (oprice)
− The “Buy It Now” price (bprice)
− The starting minimum bid (mbid)
− The ID of the wining bidder, if there is any
− The ID of the seller
− The seller’s overall feedback rating (srating)
− The length of the auction in days (duration)
A small scale follow-up survey was conducted to complement our data analyses. A
questionnaire with eight questions concerning views on “Buy It Now” option was sent to 266
bidders who chose the “Buy It Now” option in the sample we collected. Bidders’ email
addresses were obtained from eBay’s “Contact and eBay member form”. A total of 30
bidders (11.2%) responded to our questionnaire. Though the sample size is too small to
represent the whole population of eBay bidders, the questionnaire could help us understand
better the reasons for bidders’ choosing the buyout option.
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4. Data Analyses and Results
The dependent variable measuring the bidder’s choice of the “Buy It Now” option is BIN,
which is equal to 1 if the auction ended with “Buy It Now” and 0 otherwise. Logistic
regression model is used to estimate the factors that influence the bidder’s choice of the “Buy
It Now” option because a linear probability model may predict probability values beyond the
(0, 1) range (Menard 1995). The statistical model is constructed as follows:
Y = ln (ñ / 1- ñ) = â0 + â1 Difference1 + â2 Difference2 +â3 Rating + â4 Duration + å
where ñ is the probability of the bidder choosing the buyout option, and (ñ / 1- ñ) is the odds
of the bidder choosing the buyout option. Difference1 is the ratio of the difference between
online price and “Buy It Now” price, to the online price (Difference1 = (oprice – bprice) /
oprice)). Difference2 is the ratio of the difference between “Buy It Now” price and the
minimum bid, to the “Buy It Now” price (Difference2 = (bprice – mbid) / bprice)). Ratios,
instead of the absolute values of the price difference, are used so that the comparison of
auctions with items of different values could be made. Rating is the natural logarithm of
seller’s overall feedback rating (Rating = ln (srating + 1)). We add 1 to srating before taking
logarithms to avoid taking the logarithm of zero for some observations. Duration is the length
of the auction (duration).
Table 1 and 2 display the descriptive statistics of the two groups of data: transactions
ended with the “Buy It Now” option exercised and transactions ended with normal auction
prices (“Buy It Now” option was not exercised).

Variable
N
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Deviation
Difference1
373
-1.0182
0.8319
0.1457
0.2617
Difference2
373
0.0000
0.9677
0.2800
0.2230
Rating
373
2.3979
9.4201
6.5992
1.4375
Duration
373
3.0000
10.0000
4.7989
1.9973
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of “Ended With ‘Buy It Now’” Sample

Variable
N
Minimum Maximum Mean
Std. Deviation
Difference1
714
-4.0251
0.6639
-0.0754
0.4120
Difference2
714
0.0017
0.9998
0.5634
0.2833
Rating
714
0.0000
9.4200
6.7283
1.4393
Duration
714
3.0000
10.0000
4.4692
1.7509
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of “Not-Ended With ‘Buy It Now’” Sample

The descriptive statistics show that the mean of the variable Difference1 is positive
(0.1457) in the “Ended With ‘Buy It Now’” sample whereas it is negative (-0.0754) in the
“Not-Ended With ‘Buy It Now’” sample, suggesting that on average, the “Buy It Now” prices
are lower than the online prices in auctions that ended with “Buy It Now”, while the “Buy It
Now” prices are higher than the online prices in auctions that ended with normal bidding
process. Averagely the difference between minimum bid and buyout price is smaller in
auctions that the bidder chose the “Buy It Now” option than in auctions that the bidder chose
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to acquire the bear by normal eBay bidding procedure (Difference2: 0.28<0.56). The Rating
and Duration are fairly close in the two samples.
Binary Logistic Regression was performed on the 1,087 records ending with a sale. A five
percent significance level was used for all statistical tests. Table 3 shows the estimation
results.
Variables

B

S.E.

Wald

Sig.

Exp(B)

95% CI for Exp(B)
Lower
Higher
2.849
8.791
0.011
0.040
0.927
1.142
1.008
1.182

Difference1 1.610
0.287 31.375 0.000** 5.004
Difference2 -3.859
0.321 144.079 0.000** 0.021
Rating
0.028
0.053 0.282
0.596
1.029
Duration
0.088
0.041 4.665
0.031*
1.092
Constant
0.235
0.425 0.305
0.581
1.265
B - unstandardized logistic regression coefficient;
Exp(B) – exponential raised to the power of B; CI – confidence interval.
* significant at 5 % level. ** significant at 1 % level.
Table 3. Estimation Results of the Binary Logistic Regression

The overall fitness of the model is established by the Hosmer and Lemeshow test (chisquare = 11.34, significant) (Hosmer & Lemeshow 1989). The Nagelkerke R-square1 value is
0.335, indicating that the predicted variables account for 33.5% of variance of the dependent
variable. The overall percentage of cases classified correctly by the model is 74.3 %, which
also shows that the model achieves a fair degree of adequacy for predicting the dependent
variable.
Both Difference1 and Duration have significant and positive effects on the log odds of
choosing “Buy It Now”. The statistic results show that the odds of a bidder choosing “Buy It
Now” increases by a factor of 5 when the ratio of the difference between the online price and
“Buy It Now” price to the online price increases by 1 unit (when other variables are
controlled). When the duration of an auction increases by 1 day, the odds of a bidder
choosing “Buy It Now” increase by 1.092 times. Difference2 has a negative significant effect
on log odds of choosing “Buy It Now”. When the ratio of the difference between the “Buy It
Now” price and the minimum bid to the “Buy It Now” price increases, the odds of a bidder
choosing the “Buy It Now” option decrease. Rating exerts a positive effect on the log odds of
choosing “Buy It Now”, but its effect is not statistically significant. Hence, H1, H2 and H4
were supported.

5. Discussion and Conclusion
This study provides strong empirical evidence that the buyout option facilitates the faster
closing of auctions on eBay. About 49% of the auction in our raw data offered the “Buy It
Now” option, and auctions with “Buy It Now” exercised were closed days before sellers’
scheduled ending time. Findings from this study help unravel the factors determining the
bidder’s choice of temporal buyout option in Internet auction.
In line with our hypothesis, the online price plays the role of reference price that greatly
influences bidder’s choice of the buyout option. When the buyout price is lower than the
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online price, the bidder is more likely to purchase the item instantly at the buyout price
without going through the normal Internet auction process. In our follow-up survey, 50% of
the respondents replied that they would compare the “Buy It Now” prices with the prices
offered by online stores.
As hypothesized, the gap between the buyout option and the starting minimum bid
significantly affect a bidder’s decision in choosing buyout option or initiating the bidding
competition. The larger the gap, the more likely that the bidder would choose to bid instead
of buying at the buyout price. The survey results show that when asked about whether a large
difference between the “Buy It Now” price and the starting minimum bid will deter them
from choosing the “Buy It Now” option, about half of the respondents said “yes”.
Bidders’ choice of the buyout option is also greatly determined by the duration of the
auction. The longer the auction length set by the seller, the higher the possibility that the
bidder would chose the buyout option. As suggested by Vakrat and Siedmann (2000), the
lengthy bidding process might impose heavy costs on the bidders. Thus, some bidders may
want to choose the buyout option to avoid these costs and acquire their desired items faster.
In the questionnaire we collected, 38.7% respondents agree that the duration of an auction is
a consideration in choosing the buyout option. 25% of the respondents replied that an auction
with a long duration (7 to 10 days) encourages them to use the “Buy It Now” option. In
particular, one respondent brought out the fact that he was outbid at the last minute many
times, thus auction duration was considered in his decision-making.
Our results also present an unexpected finding. While the reputation of the participant is
arguably a critical factor in shopping online, the overall feedback rating of the seller does not
significantly affect the bidder choosing the buyout option in our study. One possible reason is
that the overall feedback rating is not perceived as a trustworthy sigh of a seller’s reputation
due to the weakness of the feedback rating system, which has been suggested by some
Internet auction researches (e.g., Lucking-Reiley et al. 2000). We observed that the average
overall feedback rating of the seller in our sample is very high (mean = 1812.28). Another
plausible explanation is that bidders might see no difference between purchasing the item
instantly at the buyout price and participating in the bidding process when they are facing
sellers with good reputations. Our follow-up questionnaire results support the explanations as
that majority of the respondents (67.7%) indicated that they looked at the overall feedback
ratings of sellers when asked whether such a rating is a factor affecting their choices from
whom to buy the item from, 7 out of the 21 respondents explicitly said that they would check
the feedback ratings regardless of whether they choose to exercise buyout option or choose to
bid, and 41.9% answered that they would compare the overall feedback ratings of sellers
when deciding which auction to accept the “Buy It Now” auction from.
Our paper contributes to understanding the buyer’s decision making when faced with the
buyout option in Internet auction. It helps sellers to adopt effective strategies to encourage
bidders to make an immediate purchase at the buyout price, so that they could increase their
chances of reaching a sale at the price they are willing to sell. For example, sellers should set
a reasonable buyout price comparable to the price available online, specify a minimum bid
close to the buyout price, or choose a long auction duration. Internet auction sites, such as
eBay, could also benefit from the insights provided in this study. They could provide better
service to their customers by providing sellers and buyers better advice in using the buyout
options or by revising the existing exchange tools, so that they could increase the transaction
volume and reap higher revenue. However, caution should be exercised when interpreting
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these findings because the nature of this study may reduce the generalizability of its findings
to other categories of goods and other Internet auction sites. For example, the impact of
seller’s feedback rating in auctions of “expensive” items might be different. Moreover, it is
also desirable to examine participants’ behavior in the permanent buyout option as it is
distinct from the temporary buyout option.
Acknowledgement: The authors acknowledge the contribution of Yang Kin Jun to this paper.
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